Why we get the wrong politicians - A review of sorts

Much of this article will be analysing ideas rather than reviewing the book in question. I started writing this piece just days after MPs voted against holding a general election and voted to delay Brexit until the 31st January, unless Boris Johnson can muster a deal out from his 'negotiations' with Brussels or resuscitate Theresa May's deal in some form or another. This following the government's decision to prorogue Parliament, for 5 weeks, as opposed to the typical week used for a Queen's speech. Since then, Parliament's been prorogued, 'unprorogued' and prorogued again (as of tomorrow at least). These decisions, and their subsequent responses, have once again polarised the electorate, and much anger is perhaps understandably directed at the politicians, who are frequently accused of only serving their own self-interests and more often than not towing the party line. It seems apt therefore that I'm examining Isabel Hardman's book 'Why we get the Wrong Politicians?'


In the space of a few hundred pages, Hardman outlines flaws within the legislative process and highlights how poorly legislation is scrutinised. The book has been shortlisted for many awards and I can see why. I can say that the book has changed my mind over the issue of House of Lords reform and I now have a stronger understanding of the role constituencies play in the legislative process. I don't think it is spoiling the book though to say that whilst the book doesn't directly answer the question it poses, it is still a worthy read to take in how Britain's sovereign parliament operates. In fact, I have decided to review many of Hardman's suggestions for how to improve Parliament and review both their practicality, and how effective any of these proposed changes may be. The results are mixed...

Separation of Powers
It almost goes without saying that this would be a fundamental shift in the entire functioning nature of the UK government. Until 2009, and the opening of the Supreme Court, the triumvirate of UK political power operated within the Palace of Westminster. Like the US model, by fully separating the legislature from the executive, it would in theory mean legislators would be less tied to party political affiliation and would be more inclined to legislate without mindlessly following party whips. By letting the executive sit in parliament, it reduces the number of potential government rebels and reduces the Commons' legislative function.

Yet their are ultimately several flaws with this. Having the executive in parliament makes them directly accountable to the elected representatives, something not so simple in the US. Also, the lure of executive power is still a big enough incentive for legislators to be somewhat distracted by their role as a legislator. Just look at the number of incumbent US Senators who have been on the campaign trail seeking the 2020 Presidential nomination. Or at George Weah, the Liberian footballer turned President who - as a Senator in the West African nation - never introduced or sponsored ay legislation into the Senate.

There is also a distinct lack of desire for constitutional change in the UK, something Hardman alludes to with the AV referendum of 2011. It seems therefore that such constitutional reform would be grossly ill-thought out and hardly popular. Not to mention the enhanced risk of pork barrelling to win over support in parliament.

Shrink the Executive
Of course. If the legislature can't be wrangled fully free of the executive beast haunting MPs' every move, at least tame it so that MPs no longer have a conflict of interest when legislating. But there is a murky underbelly to this and one which isn't automatically clear.

If government departments are stripped of their elected officials, then there is the potential for policy to be made by think tanks, who are known to shy away from their funding methods, and a technocratic civil service. The issue here lies not in the technocracy, but in the lack of visibility. The UK, given all the current constitutional uproar going on, really could do without increasing its democratic deficit when better alternatives are made available. Alternatives such as...

Merging Select Committees and Public Bill Committees
A somewhat radical yet surprisingly common sense idea. What if the MPs who scrutinised the workings of a government ministry, were to also scrutinise the same legislation which that same government department produced? This model is already present in the Scottish Parliament and means that MPs with at least a basic understanding of the legislation are able to review it in a less partisan atmosphere. In the interests of democracy, the government would keep its majority on this committee which always carries its risks. But having the increased understanding of the legislation they are faced with can surely only be a good thing for the laws churned out on a weekly basis. Plus it means that any proposed amendments put forward by the committee carry far more credibility on the green benches. In my opinion, this is a reform parliament could do with sooner rather than later.

Shrink the salary gap between committee chairs and the executive
Money isn't everything, and even some of the most cynical believe that MPs must be driven to do the job for some other reason (ideally that reason not being power). But if committee chairs are entitled to the equivalent salary of a Cabinet member, perhaps the level of scrutiny provided by that committee on the workings of government will be improved. So goes Hardman's line of argument anyway.

But since this book was initially published, we've seen Select Committee chairs come to a greater prominence than arguably ever before. From Yvette Cooper's management of the Windrush scandal to Hilary Benn's legislative prowess being stretched at the helm of the Brexit Select Committee, committee chairs are carving successes for themselves without such pay incentives. But whilst the role commands respect, it lacks direct legislative power. The Benn Act, or 'surrender bill' depending on your political persuasion, was passed yes thanks to Benn's swift legislative action, but also due to the government rebels and the parliamentary urgency felt by colleagues as the prorogation that wasn't loomed over them. Right now, it is difficult to justify an increase in taxpayers money to the public, when select committees are in their peak level of visibility - arguably ever since 1979 - and those MPs seeking power will remain undeterred by the prospect of entering No. 10 at some point in their careers.

All of the above suggestions are made to improve the functionality of our legislator, even if that means taking inspiration from its baby Scottish sister. But what if we instead tried to improve Parliament's composition? Hardman, had some suggestions...

Candidate Diversity campaigns
It is a known fact that the Commons is somewhat unrepresentative of the British Public at large, though this point could quite easily be made about most legislatures in the world. But what if the Electoral Commission was to receive greater funding to allow parties to offer bursaries for prospective parliamentary candidates of an ethnic minority, or disability. Parliament deserves to be more relevant to individual's lives and if every registered voter is able to enter a polling station and leave knowing that their voice has been represented on the ballot paper, then faith in politicians would greatly improve.

The issue is that political parties have neither the incentive nor financial resources to be able to do this off their own initiative. Why would any political party want to fund prospective candidates' applications when they could instead put money towards the actual election campaign? And of course, we return to the almost constant criticism of any such initiative - the use of taxpayers' money. Hardman is aware of this and makes reference of the challenges such a move would face. But the sooner parliament can be more representative of its voters, the better. We are a representative democracy after all.

Job shares for new parents
The pregnant Labour MP Stella Creasy recently announced she was hiring a 'maternity' MP to manage her constituency work whilst she is on maternity leave. Prior to this announcement, one of the more radical ideas Hardman proposed was putting two candidates on each ballot paper so that MPs would have an 'alternate' who would vote for them whilst they were on maternity or paternity leave. Yet with the proxy voting trial so far going smoothly in the Commons, it seems somewhat unlikely that this idea will ever come to fruition. It had it's flaws in the first place. On social issues, in which MPs are given a free vote, these two representatives have the potential to strongly differ on their views, such are the broadchurches of the major political parties. Plus, having an individual representative for a constituency appears to be the primary argument for maintaining First Past the Post, and this creation of a List system would undermine that argument. (It could therefore be argued that proponents of electoral reform would welcome such an initiative)

So what have we learnt? Well, Parliament has some image problems, problems which will not go away very easily. That said, Hardman has suggested some very easy, useful ways to improve the legislative scrutiny that goes on in Parliament, having witnessed it herself for many years. The challenge however, is convincing public appeal to get behind it, and for the MPs to accept their own shortcomings. And this means that, in trying to implement these solutions, there could come a whole new raft of problems.